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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Priority No. 2

V.

ARTURO RAMIREZ,
Case No. 960847-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF APPEAL
On September 12, 1996, this Court affirmed defendant's convictions for two
second-degree felonies, i.e., possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, and arranging to distribute a controlled substance. State v. Ramirez, 924
P.2d 366, 371 (Utah App. 1996). Though affirming the convictions, this Court also
vacated the sentences due to lack of writtenfindingson the trial court's enhancement to
a six-year minimum mandatory term under the "acting in concert with two or more
persons" provision in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(5)(c) (1995). Id.
On remand, the trial court issued written findings and reaffirmed the minimum
mandatory sentence. Defendant appeals from that decision. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996).
ISSUES AND REVIEW STANDARD
1.

Does subsection 76-3-203. l(5)(c), which directs the trial court to find if a

defendant acts in concert with two or more persons, violate the right to a jury trial?

The constitutionality of a statute is a matter of law; consequently, this Court accords no
deference to a trial court's analysis. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).
2.

Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings that

defendant acted in concert with two or more persons? When challenging findings of
fact, a defendant must marshal the evidence that favors the finding and then
demonstrate why the evidence is insufficient to support it. State v. Robertson, 932
P.2d 1219, 1223-24 (Utah 1997).
STATUTORY PROVISION
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons - Enhanced
penalties.
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in
conceit with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the
offense as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable
for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.

(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are:

(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.

2

(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c,
regarding drug-related offenses;

(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an
enhanced penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of
those persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser
offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
After remand from a previous appellate court ruling in this matter, i.e, State v.
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1996), the trial court held a hearing at which he
heard argument from trial counsel about the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 763-203. l(5)(c) (1995) and the facts linking defendant to two other persons in the
commission of this crime (R. 488). The trial court found that the evidence did establish
that fact and consequently sentenced him to a six-year minimum mandatory term (R.
489).
3

Factual Statement
On December 29, 1994, Mary Nevarez, her infant son, and defendant drove to
the home of Mary's mother and stepfather Robert Larsen (R. 206, 255, 365).
Following defendant's directions, Mary went inside to ask Larsen if she could borrow
his car and some money for a trip to California (R. 255). ! Because Mary apparently
did not relay defendant's message properly, the three returned the next morning. After
defendant talked to Larsen, Larsen loaned defendant and Mary his car and $550, with
the understanding that he would get his money back after the trip, along with 3 to 4
grams of methamphetamine (R. 153, 210, 257). Defendant then gave Larsen a plastic
baggie containing methamphetamine as insurance against the loss of the car and money
(R. 154, 258-59).
Later on the 30th, defendant and Mary left for California in Larsen's vehicle.
Stopping at various locations along the way, they gambled and lost all but $400 of the
$550 Larsen had given them as well as Mary's pension money (R. 202, 281-82, 286).
They finally arrived at defendant's sister's house in California sometime in the morning
of December 31 (R. 287).

1

Saying that he felt remorse for agreeing to help defendant and his colleagues bring in
methamphetamine, Mr. Larsen reported the criminal plans to the police (R. 328). He gave them a
description of the car, the license plate number, and told them approximately when the delivery was to
occur (R. 329-32). Consequently, the police followed the car and arrested the participants shortly after
they consumed the drugs at Melanie Timmons' home in St. George (R. 339).
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With the remaining $400, defendant bought drugs from people he met in his
sister's garage (R. 294-95). Defendant hid the drugs, packaged in condoms, in
Larsen's car "underneath the back ashtray . . . where the stick shift goes into" (R.
264). Defendant and Mary left California on the evening of the 31st (R. 287, 375).
On the way home, defendant and Mary met Melanie Timmons in Mesquite (R.
291, 347, 355, 377). According to Mary, defendant had arranged the meeting:
"[Melanie] was supposed to meet us there, because she had her car. That way, if we
were being followed, they wouldn't know what car the drugs were in" (R. 265).
However, Melanie's car had broken down, and she and her "guy friend" ended up
driving back to Utah with defendant and Mary in Larsen's car (R. 291, 348, 377).
After dropping the friend off, Melanie, defendant, and Mary drove to Melanie's
apartment, arriving there in the pre-dawn hours of January 1 (R. 298, 350, 378).
Defendant took some methamphetamine from the car, and the three of them "did some
speed" (R. 296-98). Defendant also gave Mary a green bindle to deliver to Larsen (R.
297). Mary and Melanie then drove over to Larsen's home, where Mary gave Larsen
the green bindle, as instructed (R. 300).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Subsection 76-3-203. l(5)(c) does not abridge defendant's right to trial by jury.
Under governing federal supreme court precedent, the statute neither creates another
element nor a different criminal offense. Instead, the statute tells the trial court what
5

weight it should give in sentencing to criminal conduct that occurs in conceit with three
or more people.
Additionally, the trial court based its finding that three or more people were
involved in this crime on sufficient evidence. Even if this Court reviews the merits of
this claim, ignoring defendant's slanted recitation of the evidence, the trial court based
its decision on the testimony of Mary Nevarez, which it found credible, clear, and
convincing. That testimony sufficed to establish the enhancement and, consequently,
the trial court's determination should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

SUBSECTION 76-3-203.1(5)(c) DOES NOT DENY
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL BECAUSE
IT ONLY DIRECTS THE COURT WHAT WEIGHT IT
SHOULD GIVE A PARTICULAR FACTOR IN
SENTENCING.

Defendant asserts that he was entitled to have a jury determine whether he was
involved with two or more persons in the commission of his crimes (Brief of Defendant
at 6-10). Because the trial court made that factual decision instead, defendant argues
that he was denied his constitutional right to trial by jury.
At the outset, however, defendant is not entitled to appellate review of this claim
because his brief does not support it with specific, relevant legal authority. The only
authority defendant quotes is a civil case, Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson,
604 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1979). There, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that when a trial
6

court rules on motions that take matters away from a jury, it should examine the
evidence in a light favorable to the party moved against. Mel Hardman Productions,
604 P.2d at 917. Though the case restates the essential principle that the right to a jury
trial should be "carefully safequarded," it is not relevant in its facts to subsection 76-3203.1(5)(c) or enhancement statutes generally.
Defendant asks for a drastic remedy, i.e., invalidation of a statute on
constitutional grounds. That type of remedy can only be justified by the most extreme
circumstances and well-argued and reasoned law. Defendant does not make this
argument and his claim for statutory invalidation, therefore, should not be considered.
Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996).
Even on the merits, however, defendant's claim fails. His fundamental premise
is that the "acting in concert" provision changed the substantive nature of the offense
for which he was convicted. In other words, the crime for which defendant was
sentenced differed from the crime of which the jury convicted him.
The fundamental flaw in defendant's argument already has been articulated in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, All U.S. 79 (1986). In McMillan, the United States
Supreme Court rejected due process and sixth amendment challenges to a statute
providing that persons convicted of certain felonies would be subject to a minimum
mandatory sentence of five years if the trial court found that the person "visibly
possessed a firearm" while committing the crime. Id, at 81. The Court upheld the
7

statute, ruling that it left unaffected the presumption of innocence and the State's
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The enhancement statute did not
change the definition of the crime or the maximum penalty, nor did it create a separate
offense. Id. at 87-88.
Instead, the Pennsylvania statute took one factor and mandated the exact weight
the trial court could accord it in sentencing.
Section 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty for the
crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a
separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing
court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range
already available to it without the special finding of visible
possession of a firearm. Section 9712 "ups the ante" for the
defendant only by raising the five years the minimum
sentence which may be imposed within the statutory plan.
Id. at 87-88 (footnote omitted). Thus deciding that section 9712 did not create a new
offense, the high court concluded that the right to jury trial did not include the right to
jury sentencing, "even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact." Id. at 93.
Because section 9712 was a sentencing provision only, it did not conflict with the jury
trial right. Subsection 76-3-203.l(5)(c) closely tracks the statute that the McMillan
court upheld. It leaves undisturbed the elements of the underlying crime and becomes
effective only upon conviction of the base crime. Though it "ups the ante" for
defendant, it does so without increasing the maximum penalty or creating a separate
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offense. All the statute does, as in McMillan, is dictate the weight that trial court
should give one factor in sentencing.
O.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO FIND THAT TWO PEOPLE IN ADDITION TO
DEFENDANT WERE INVOLVED IN THE
POSSESSION AND ARRANGING FOR THE SALE OF
METHAMPHETAMINE; THEREFORE,
DEFENDANT'S SUFFICffiNCY CHALLENGE
SHOULD BE REJECTED.

Defendant challenges the evidentiary basis for the trial court's finding that
Melanie Timmons was part of defendant's criminal conduct. Brief of Defendant at 1012. He claims insufficiency to support that finding, which, if overturned, would
require reversal of the enhancement. However, defendant's purported marshaling of
the evidence does not meet that strict requirement because it relies on selected, and
slanted portions of the testimony. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse,
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). This Court need not consider
defendant's claim of insufficiency due to this marshaling failure; however, even if it
did, the trial court's findings were based on a firm factual foundation and, should be
affirmed.
"Successful challenges tofindingsof fact must demonstrate to appellate courts
first how the trial court found the facts from the evidence, and second why such
findings contradict the weight of the evidence." State in the Interest ofS.T., 928 P.2d
393, 400 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1053)). Though
9

defendant purports to marshal the evidence in favor of the trial court's findings,
actually, he only presents selected, and favorable, portions. This is not satisfy
Oneida's marshaling test, which specifically says that an appellant cannot simply
attempt to reargue his case by using "selected facts and excerpts in support of its
position.n Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053.
In his purported "marshaling," defendant raises only snippets of relevant
testimony, pointing out the few ambiguities in Mary Nevarez's statements and ignoring
the many consistencies. He leaves out important evidence about Ms. Nevarez'
admitted involvement and her testimony about Melanie Timmons' involvement:2 (1)
defendant had arranged with Ms. Timmons to meet at the Peppermill casino and follow
him and Ms. Nevarez back to Salt Lake City so that police would not know which car
contained the drugs (R. 264-65)3; (2) defendant told Ms. Nevarez that he went over to
Ms. Timmons' house to divide the drugs (R. 267); (3) defendant, Ms. Nevarez, Ms.
Timmons, and another person used the methamphetamine (R. 268, 297). Defendant
also relies on the testimony of Ms. Timmons whereas the trial court did not.
Instead, the trial court grounded its findings on Ms. Nevarez' testimony, "the
testimony of Mary Nevarez was convincing, clear, and proof to the Court beyond a
2

Ms. Nevarez testified for the State (R. 253); Ms. Timmons testified for the defense (R.

346).
3

This plan ultimately failed because Ms. Timmons' car broke down in Las Vegas (R.
264). She went the rest of the way with defendant and Ms. Nevarez (id.). Consequently, they were all
in the same car, at the same time, with the methamphetamine.
10

reasonable doubt as to this transaction and the activities taking place in the furtherance
of the criminal enterprise" (R. 486). Her testimony was credible, especially given her
own then-pending trial on drug possession charges (R. 273).4 A careful review of the
trial court's findings shows that it was based on the evidence and it contains no "fatal
flaw" (R. 487).
7.
That the anticipated plan of the parties, which never
came to fruition, was to transfer the drugs that were
purchased to Ms. Timmons' vehicle and have Ms.
Timmons' vehicle carry the drugs into the State of Utah in
order to defeat any potential police surveillance. That plan
went awry.
8.
That Ms. Timmons' vehicle broke down, and she was
in Mesquite without a vehicle. Therefore, all three, Ms.
Timmons, Mr. Ramirez, and Ms. Nevarez, travelled [sic]
back to Utah, again with the single criminal objective and
the single criminal enterprise of transporting this
methamphetamine back to the State of Utah.

10.
That the Court further finds ... the Defendant, Ms. Nevarez,
and Ms. Timmons, went to Ms. Timmons' apartment and there
together injecting [sic] methamphetamine, and based upon that final
completing act of the transportation, the acquiring, and eventually
the use of methamphetamine, the Court entered the order
enhancing the sentence.
(R. 487-88; Findings of Fact, attached as addendum).

4

Ms. Nevarez stated that she was subpoenaed to testify at defendant's trial and that the
State had promised her she would not be certified as an adult in exchange for the testimony (R. 273).
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The trial court's findings were consistent with the evidence and supported by it.
Therefore, defendant's challenge to its sufficiency must fail, both on substantive
grounds and due to his failure to marshal correctly.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's imposition of a six-year minimum mandatory enhancement
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS j>_ July 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On ^ _ July 1997,1 mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) copies of
this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:
LaMAR J. WINWARD
150 North 200 East, Suite 204
St. George, Utah 84770

U/rtu»- AlAjkf
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FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
AMENDED JUDGMENT, FINDINGS,
SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 951*00020 FS

ARTURO RAMIREZ,

Judge:

Defendant.

James L. Shumate

The above-entitled matter having come on before the Court
after remand from the Court of Appeals for entry of additional
findings supporting the Court's conclusion that defendant acted
in concert with two or more persons during the commission of
Count II, Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a 2nd
Degree Felony, and for re-sentencing based upon these findings on
the on the 20th day of November, 1996, with the Plaintiff being
represented by Wade Farraway, Deputy Washington County Attorney,
and the Defendant, ARTURO RAMIREZ, being present and represented
by Lamar J. Winward, and counsel for Defendant having made his
arguments and recommendations to the Court, and counsel for
Plaintiff having been heard in rebuttal, and the Court being
fully advised in the premises, and there being no reason why
judgment should not be entered, now makes and enters its
Judgment, Findings, Sentence, and Commitment, as follows:

d<7^

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
Defendant, ARTURO RAMIREZ, is guilty of the offense of COUNT I:
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a
2nd Degree Felony, and COUNT II: ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a 2nd Degree Felony.
PINDINGS
THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That the Defendant, together with Mary Nevarez, had a

close relationship in the latter part of 1994 and early 1995.
2.

That on December 29, 1994, Ms. Nevarez and the Defendant

went to the home of Robert Larson.

There a discussion was held

with Ms. Nevarez and Mr. Larson and the Defendant in which it was
discussed that the Defendant and Ms. Nevarez would borrow Mr.
Larsonfs car to make a trip to California, and there acquire
methamphetamine.
3.

The Court's findings are based upon the Courtfs finding

that the testimony of Mary Nevarez was convincing, clear, and
proof to the Court beyond a reasonable doubt as to this
transaction and the activities taking place in the furtherance of
this criminal enterprise.
4.

That Mr. Larson, as I indicated at the time of

sentencing and as I again indicate, has no credibility before
this court, and based upon Mr. Larson's testimony and his version
of the events and the events, this Court could not make a
finding, even by a preponderance of the evidence, so the Court is
relying substantially on the careful evaluation of the testimony

of Ms. Nevarez, my understanding of her testimony, and the other
physical circumstances supporting her testimony, the traveling of
the car and those kinds of things that were observed by the
witnesses.
5.

The Court further finds that the factual background that

Ms. Nevarez and the Defendant also received $550 from Mr. Larson,
which they took oOn the trip with them to California.

A portion

of that money was to be expended for the purchase of
methamphetamine in the State of California, and $400 was expended
for that purpose.
6.

That the Defendant and Ms. Nevarez, after purchasing the

drugs in California, spending the $400 on that purchase, came
back to the State of Utah along Interstate 15, had planned to
meet and in fact did meet with Melanie Timmons in Mesquite,
Nevada.
7.

That the anticipated plan of the parties, which never

came to fruition, was to transfer the drugs that were purchased
to Ms. Timmons1 vehicle and have Ms. Timmons1 vehicle carry the
drugs into the State of Utah in order to defeat any potential
police surveillance.
8.

That plan went awry.

That Ms. Timmons' vehicle broke down, and she was in

Mesquite without a vehicle.

Therefore, all three, Ms. Timmons,

Mr. Ramirez, and Ms. Nevarez, travelled back to Utah, again with
the single criminal objective and the single criminal enterprise
of transporting this methamphetamine back to the State of Utah.
9.

That there was a friend in the company of Ms. Timmons,

but the Court does not find, and has no evidence before it, and

u

i i

did not at the time of trial have any evidence that this friend
was in any way involved with the criminal enterprise.

The

evidence and testimony was convincing to the Court only as to the
involvement of Melanie Timmons.
10.

That the Court further finds that once the friend was

dropped off from the car, the three individuals, the Defendant,
Ms. Nevarez, and Ms. Timmons, went to Ms. Timmons1 apartment and
there together injesting methamphetamine, and based upon that
final completing act of the transportation, the acquiring, and
eventually the use of methamphetamine, the Court entered the
order enhancing the sentence.
11.

That with respect to the ruling that the defense has

urged upon the Court regarding the constitutionality of Section
76-3-203.2, this Court finds that the statute is, in fact,
constitutional, and that I will not step outside the ordinary
rules for trial courts of construing statutes.
12.

That based upon the foregoing findings, the Defendant

shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisons of Section
76-3-203.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant, ARTURO RAMIREZ, shall serve one less than one (1) year
nor more than fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison and pay
a fine in the amount of $10,000.00, plus a surcharge of $8,500.00
for his conviction for COUNT I:

POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED

SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a 2nd Degree Felony.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

(\9<Z

Defendant, ARTURO RAMIREZ, shall serve in enhanced minimum term
of not less than six (6) years nor more than fifteen (15) years
in the Utah State Prison and pay a fine in the amount of
$10,000,00, plus a surcharge of $8,500,00 for his conviction for
COUNT II: ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a 2nd
Degree Felony.
COMMITMENT
THE SHERIFF OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, State of Utah, is hereby
commanded to transport the Defendant, ARTURO RAMIREZ, to the Utah
State Prison, there to be kept and confined in accordance with
the above Order.

. " .v

\,

DATED this / Q day of Decembe^, 1$36;

STATE OF UTAH

)
* ss

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)

*1
JAMES. L, SHUMATE "\. „'
^DISTRICT' COURT J U D G W
.- 2
CERTIFICATE c.,C-, u
^^
^sssssS>^

I, Linda Williamson, Clerk of said District Court of
Washington County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
Honorable James L. Shumate, whose name is subscribed to the
preceding certificate, is the Judge of said Court, duly
commissioned and qualified, and that the signature of said Judge
to said certificate is genuine*
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have^lSrtiCr^o^t my hand and
affixed the seal of the Court thig' vy* daj^^ltecember, 1996.
LINDASm*
WILLIAMSON,:
by
fl\.Kk£/ Clerk
DEPUTY CLERK .." ^ /
^>^

SHERIFF'S RETURN
I do hereby certify that on the a&> day of *£ecenitoer,—1996,
the Defendant, AR*-URO RAMIREZ, was transported to the Utah State
Prison, there to be kept and confined in accordance with the
above Commitment.

L,M

OA^^

JON J.
WASHIjfGTM COUNTY/UNDERSHERIFF
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this U^*- day of December, 1996, I
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OPINION

BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Arturo Ramirez appeals his jury convictions for possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1995), and arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995). We affirm
defendant's conviction but vacate defendant's sentence for lack of sufficient findings of fact and
remand for appropriate findings and resentencing.
FACTS
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Hancock, 874
P.2d 132, 133 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
On December 29, 1994, Mary Nevarez, her infant son, and defendant drove to the home of
Ms. Nevarez's mother and stepfather, Robert Larsen. Pursuant to defendant's instructions, Ms.
Nevarez went inside to ask Mr. Larsen if she could borrow his car and some money for a trip she
and defendant were taking to California. Because Ms. Nevarez apparently did not relay the
message properly, the three returned the next morning and defendant spoke with Mr. Larsen.
After their conversation, Mr. Larsen agreed to loan defendant and Ms. Nevarez his car and $
550, with the understanding that he would get his money back after the trip, along with
three-to-four grams of methamphetamine. Defendant then handed Mr. Larsen a plastic baggie
containing methamphetamine to insure against the loss of the car and money.
Defendant and Ms. Nevarez left for California in Mr. Larsen's vehicle later that day. They
made several stops along the way, gambling and losing approximately $ 150 of the money Mr.
Larsen had loaned them. The two finally arrived at the home of defendant's sister in California.
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With the remaining $ 400, defendant purchased drugs from people he met within his sister's
garage. He then hid the drugs in Mr. Larsen's vehicle. Defendant and Ms. Nevarez left California
that evening.
On their way home, defendant and Ms. Nevarez met Melanie Timmons in Mesquite, Nevada.
According to Ms. Nevarez, defendant had pre-arranged this meeting. Ms. Nevarez stated: "[Ms.
Timmons] was supposed to meet us there, because she had a car. That way, if we were being
followed, they wouldn't know what car the drugs were in." However, Ms. Timmons's car had
broken down and she and a friend wound up chiving back to Utah with defendant and Ms.
Nevarez.
Once in Utah, they dropped Ms. Timmons's friend off and then drove to her apartment in the
early morning hours of January 1, 1995. Defendant took some methamphetamine from the car,
and the three of them "did some speed." At that time, defendant gave Ms. Nevarez a green bindle
to deliver to Mr. Larsen. Ms. Timmons and Ms. Nevarez then drove to Mr. Larsen's home, where
Ms. Nevarez gave him the green bindle as instructed.
Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged in a criminal information with Count I,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and Count II, arranging to
distribute a controlled substance. The charging information also alleged the offenses were
performed in concert with two or more individuals, and thus, defendant was subject to an
enhanced minimum sentence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1995).
A jury trial was held on May 4, 1995. After defendant put on his case, the State filed a
Motion in Limine requesting permission to allow Ms. Nevarez to testify on rebuttal as to other
similar trips she had taken with defendant to purchase drugs. The trial court granted the motion
over defendant's objection. The jury found defendant guilty of both counts.
At the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel objected to the trial court's imposition of an
enhanced penalty because the question of how many persons were involved was never put to the
jury. The court overruled defendant's objections, stating the statute expressly authorized the
court, not the jury, to find that the defendant acted in "concert" with two or more persons. The
court thereafter entered a ruling that defendant had acted in concert with Ms. Nevarez and Ms.
Timmons in committing Count II and enhanced the penalty for that offense to a six-year
minimum mandatory term. Defendant appeals.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
On appeal, defendant claims: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Ms.
Nevarez's testimony regarding two previous drug-buying trips she had taken with defendant, (2)
defendant was denied his constitutional right to a trial by jury when the trial court, acting
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1995), found he acted in concert with two or
more persons in arranging to distribute a controlled substance, and (3) the trial court's findings of
fact supporting its sentence enhancement were inadequate.
ANALYSIS
Utah Rules of Evidence 404 and 403
Defendant first contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Ms. Nevarez's
testimony regarding two previous trips she had allegedly taken with defendant to purchase drugs
and therefore his conviction should be reversed and he should be granted a new trial.
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Specifically, defendant argues the evidence should not have been admitted under Rule 404(b),
Utah Rules of Evidence, because the sole purpose of the testimony was to show defendant's bad
character. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Alternatively, defendant claims that even if the evidence is
admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial court nonetheless erred in admitting the evidence under
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, because the prejudicial value of the evidence clearly
outweighed it probativeness. See id. Rule 403.
When reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence under Rules 403
and 404, this court will sustain the trial court's ruling unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion.
State v, Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1221 (Utah 1993).
Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Utah courts have recognized that Rule 404(b) is an "inclusionary" rule.
State v. OfNeil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993); State
v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991). That is, Rule 404(b) "does not exclude evidence
unless it fits an exception; rattier, it allows admission of relevant evidence 'other than to show
merely the general disposition of the defendant.'" State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah
App. 1989) (quoting State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983)).
In overruling defendant's objections and admitting the instant testimony, the trial court stated:
It is the clear circumstance in this case that Mr. Ramirez' testimony brought into direct
question the presence of his knowledge of what may have been criminal activity under a
possibility of his theory of the lawsuit. That is, that Miss Nevarez, without telling him what was
going on, perpetrated a fraud upon Mr. Larsen. Talked him out of money with the plan of
exchanging a small amount of drugs as part of a scheme to talk Mr. Larsen out of his vehicle and
his money. The testimony of Miss Nevarez on rebuttal negated that issue.
It also showed the possibility of intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and absence of mistake
or accident on the part of Mr. Ramirez.
We agree that, by presenting himself as one who was innocently involved in criminal activity
engineered solely by Ms. Nevarez, defendant put his own knowledge and intent squarely at issue.
Therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting Ms. Nevarez's rebuttal testimony under Rule
404(b). State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135,136 (Utah 1978).
In Brown, the Utah Supreme Court found, under predecessor Rule 55, that by testifying he
was innocently involved in his son's criminal actions, Brown directly put in issue his own
knowledge and intent. Id. The court therefore held that evidence of an alleged prior, similar
offense was properly admitted as evidence of Brown's knowledge and intent for the instant
offense despite Brown's claim that the evidence was highly prejudicial. Id. Similarly, in this
case, as soon as defendant offered his theory of the case-that Ms. Nevarez had misled him and
had perpetrated afraudon Mr. Larsen-defendant's prior drug-buying trips to California with Ms.
Nevarez became relevant to the issue of his knowledge and intent. Accordingly, the trial court's
admission of Ms. Nevarez's testimony under Rule 404(b) was not an abuse of discretion.
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Defendant next contends the court nevertheless erred in finding, pursuant to Rule 403, the
probative value of the evidence "substantially outweighed . . . the danger of unfair prejudice."
Utah R. Evid. 403. We note that Rule 403, like Rule 404(b), is an "inclusionary" rule. State v.
Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1996). Specifically, Rule 403 "presumes the
admission of all relevant evidence except where the evidence has 'an unusual propensity to
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead' the jury." Id. (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1221-22 (Utah 1993)). Moreover, the fact that evidence is prejudicial does not, by itself, render
that evidence inadmissible. Rather, "if the evidence is prejudicial but is at least equally
probative[,]... it is properly admissible." Taylor, 818 P.2d at 571.
In balancing the probative value of Rule 404(b) evidence against the danger of unfair
prejudice, the trial court should consider factors such as "'[1] the similarities between the crimes
[and] the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, [2] the need for the evidence [and]
the efficacy of alternative proof, and [3] the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the
jury to overmastering hostility.'" Id. (citation omitted). The record in the instant case clearly
supports the balance struck by the trial court. First, in the six weeks preceding this incident, Ms.
Nevarez testified she accompanied defendant on two similar trips to California for the purpose of
purchasing drugs. See 818 P.2d at 569 ('"Proximity in time combined with similarity in type of
crime virtually guarantees admittance of prior bad acts evidence.'") (quoting United States v.
Drew, 894 F.2d 965, 970 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1089, 110 S. Ct. 1830, 108 L. Ed. 2d
959 (1990)). Further, the testimony elicited at trial was conflicting regarding the purpose of the
trip and defendant's knowledge and intent in making the trip; thus, the need for the evidence was
great. Finally, the evidence was not of the sort that would likely "rouse the jury to overmastering
hostility." Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that any prejudice inherent in Ms. Nevarez's
testimony was clearly outweighed by its probative effect. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting her testimony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1
Defendant next contends that he was denied his constitutional right to a trial by jury when the
judge made certain factual findings under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1995) in order to
impose a gang enhancement upon his sentence. Utah courts have consistently refused to reach the
constitutionality of a statute when there are other independent grounds to resolve the case. See
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah App. 1987). In accordance with this view, we
decline to determine the constitutionality of the statute in this case as we vacate defendant's
enhanced sentence and remand in order for the trial court to make the written findings of fact
required under the statute. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 1996 Utah LEXIS 48, 293 Utah
Adv. Rep. 19, 21 (Utah 1996) (holding failure of trial court to make written findings of fact
under section 76-3-203.1 was both plain and harmful error).
In Labrum, the supreme court held the imposition of [section 76-3-20l(5)(c)] is explicitly
"contingent upon" findings of particular enumerated facts that are to be rendered in writing.
Specifically, the defendant must have acted "in concert" with at least two other persons, which ..
. means that those other persons must also be liable [though not necessarily charged or convicted]
for the underlying offense. These findings are indispensable to [section 76-3-201] because they
establish the legal basis that justifies imposition of the prescribed penalty. Moreover, the
requirement for written findings appears in the text of the statute
Id, at 21. The court concluded that the trial court's failure to enter any written findings of
fact was error, both plain and harmful. Id, Pursuant to Labrum, we conclude defendant's failure
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to object to the adequacy of the trial court's findings below does not preclude this court from
reaching that issue on appeal. Certainly, a trial court's failure to comply with the express terms of
section 76-3-203.l(5)(c) constitutes plain error.
The trial court's onlyfindingin the instant case states:
1. The defendant acted in concert with Melanie Timmons and Mary Nevarez in the
commission of Count II, Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony.
This finding is not based on the testimony of Robert Larsen.
Defendant claims this finding does not comply with section 76-3-203. l(5)(c) and asserts the
finding "[is] more in nature of [a] conclusionf ] of law on the part of the judge and not [a]
finding[ ] of fact showing the other parties' involvement in the alleged crimes or why their
involvement meets the elements of the particular statute in question." On appeal, this court must
therefore determine whether the trial court's singular statement is adequate to support the court's
imposition of an enhanced minimum mandatory term pursuant to section 76-3-203.1.
Relying upon Labrum, this court recently rejected the State's claim that when reviewing the
trial court's findings pursuant to section 76-3-201, a similar sentencing statute, "this court should
imply the requisite facts because '[a] finding may be implied if it is clear from the record, and
therefore apparent upon review, that the finding was actually made as part of the tribunal's
decision.'" State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 1996 Utah App. LEXIS 75, 294 Utah Adv. Rep.
3, 6 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted). This court declined to imply the aggravating facts
where there was no mitigating evidence offered at sentencing, instead holding that the "trial
court's failure to enter findings regarding the aggravating circumstances . . . was error." Id. at 7.
Thus, in interpreting the supreme court's holding in Labrum, this court implicitly held that
findings of fact may not be inferred, but must clearly be made part of the record at sentencing.
Id. at 6-7; see also State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1990) (holding
judgment of prior conviction providing basis for sentence enhancement must be written, clear,
and definite).
Similarly, in the instant case, we will not merely imply what testimony might have persuaded
the trial court in imposing an enhanced minimum term pursuant to section 76-3-203.l(5)(c).
Accordingly, under Labrum and Beltran-Felix, the trial court's failure to enter detailed factual
findings supporting its imposition of an enhanced penalty was error, and we therefore vacate
defendant's sentence and remand to the trial court for it to make appropriate factual findings and
for resentencing.
CONCLUSION
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Ms. Nevarez's
rebuttal testimony, pursuant to Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, as defendant
put his knowledge and intent at issue by his own characterization of the case. Further, we
conclude the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact supporting its conclusion that
defendant acted in concert with two or more persons during the commission of Count II.
Accordingly, we vacate defendant's sentence and remand for the court to make appropriate
factual findings and for resentencing based upon those findings.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
CONCURRENCE
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WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge Regnal W. Garff, Senior Judge
JUDGES FOOTNOTES
1 Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-4(2) (1995); Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-108(4).
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